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Fear and anger are basic emotions of the same valence which differ in terms of their
certainty and control dimensions according to the Appraisal Tendency Framework,
a theory addressing the relationship between specific emotions, and judgments and
choices. Past research based on the Appraisal Theory revealed contradictory results for
risky choice decision-making. However, these conclusions were drawn from Western
samples (e.g., North American). Considering potential cultural differences, the present
study aims to investigate whether the Appraisal Tendency hypothesis yields the same
results in a Chinese sample. Our first study explores how dispositional fear and anger
influence risk preferences through a classic virtual “Asia Disease Problem” task and
the second study investigates how induced fear and anger influence risk preferences
through an incentive-compatible task. Consistent with previous research, our results
reveal that induced fear and anger have differential effects on risky decisions: angry
participants prefer the risk-seeking option, whereas fearful participants prefer a risk-
averse option. However, we find no associations between dispositional fear (or anger)
and risky decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, China has seen an increase in the prevalence of cynicism, cyber-bullying, and
aggressive behavior in the population. The Annual Report on Social Mentality of China (Wang and
Yang, 2011) has suggested that resentment or anger has become the most typical social mentality
in current day China. In addition, a public survey of 12 major cities in China (Ouyang, 2010),
revealed the severe anxiety that Chinese individuals experience over safety issues such as food,
public order, medicine, traffic, and the environment. The emotions of anger and fear easily spread
through the present-day internet and social media environment, and may then contribute to or
cause real emergencies, intensifying the negative consequences. Hence, fear and anger merit special
attention in academic research and policy making.
Since the establishment of the pioneering psychometric model by Fischhoff et al. (1978),
researchers have increasingly recognized the important role of emotions in risk perception
(Xie et al., 2011). They have found that emotions not only influence people’s cognition,
reflected in attention and perception of self and others, but also explain and trigger memories.
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Researchers in cognitive psychology have considered the effects
of affective states in the context of the dual-process theories,
which distinguish between a cognitive process that is reliant
on analysis versus an emotional one that is reliant on general
knowledge structures (for reviews, see Chaiken and Trope, 1999).
Although emotions can serve as cues to aid making judgments
and decisions, some emotions can interfere with a person’s
ability to make rational judgments, and biases their information
retrieval and processing, hence, producing a barrier to effective
risk communication (Slovic et al., 2004).
Research on judgment and decision making has considered
the influence of individual affect. While most of studies in
this field have been motivated by a Valence Theory (see
Forgas, 1995), relatively few researchers have addressed the
influences of specific emotions on judgment and choice. The
Valence Theory focuses on the influence of positive emotions
compared to negative emotions on decision making (DeSteno
et al., 2000). Experimental evidence shows that a negative
mood can lead to relatively pessimistic expectations, whereas
a positive mood can lead to relatively optimistic expectations
(Mayer and Hanson, 1995; Waters, 2008). However, recent
studies have provided evidence that contradicts the tempting
assumption that all negative emotions fit the valence-congruent
patterns; specifically, research into the effects of emotion on
attribution, evaluation, and judgments involving risk suggests
that anger has distinct effects compared to other negative
emotions (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). An experimental study
revealed that fear and anger would result in conflicting effects
on a risky choice despite having the same valence (Lerner and
Keltner, 2001).
Considering the obvious shortcoming of Valence-based
approaches, the more recent Appraisal Theory focuses on specific
emotions rather than on global emotion valences (Moors, 2007;
Oatley et al., 2011), and therefore accounts for the conflicting
effects of different negative emotions like fear and anger on
decision making. Fear and anger are the most common negative
emotional reactions in daily life and have important implications
on decision making under risk (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006).
According to Valence Theory, fear and anger should be associated
with risk aversion due to their negative valence. However, the
Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF; Han et al., 2007) indicates
that fear results in risk aversion while anger leads to risk-seeking
choices. The ATF addresses how and why specific emotions carry
over from past situations to color future judgments and choices
(Han et al., 2007; Lerner et al., 2007). It is assumed that anger and
fear are located differently on the dimensions of certainty and
control. Past research found that high certainty and individual
control are associated with anger, whereas uncertainty and low
situational control are associated with fear (Smith and Ellsworth,
1985). Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) originally applied the
ATF in examining emotion-based differences in judgments and
choices involving risk; their results supported the Appraisal-
Tendency Hypothesis, that is, fearful people make pessimistic
risk assessments, whereas angry people make optimistic risk
assessments.
However, will the ATF yield the same results in another
cultural context, such as China, a rapidly developing ancient
civilization? Although the basic emotions of human beings
are universal and people from different cultures have many
similar emotional reactions, substantial differences exist among
emotional responses, expressions, and concepts in a multi-
cultural background (Chen, 2011). In fact, the role of culture
on emotional reactivity has been documented in the literature
(see Chentsova-Dutton and Tsai, 2010; Chentsova-Dutton et al.,
2010). In the United States, expressing anger seems to reflect
the degree to which people experience negative events, while
in Japan it may reflect the degree to which people feel
empowered and entitled. It is believed that anger expression
is a complex phenomenon likely motivated by a variety of
factors, many of which could be culture-specific (Kitayama
et al., 2015). In this case, we must consider the potential
cultural differences when using the ATF to explain the judgments
and decision making of people in China and to guide
policymaking.
Chinese culture has left a deep imprint of “peacefulness”
and “reservation” in people’s characters; Chinese people are
encouraged to preserve their sanity, by maintaining a peaceful
mind, and controlling their emotions in most situations (Wang
and Cui, 2008). According to Qiao and Ji (2002), people in
Western cultures tend to link the social meanings of behaviors
with their emotional experiences, whereas those in Eastern
cultures, especially in China, recognize the social meanings of
individual behaviors from a social context. Some researchers
suggested that members of individualistic cultures are relatively
comfortable in expressing their negative emotions, whereas
members of collectivistic cultures may feel ashamed to express
their negative emotions (Chen, 2011). Take anger as an example;
in Western culture people prefer to express their anger, whereas
in Eastern culture they prefer to suppress it. Actually, people
suppress their anger to avoid the potential effects it might have on
their behavior, which complies with the doctrines of Confucius
and Mencius in China. The core essence of Confucianism is
“benevolence, righteousness, courtesy, wisdom, and trust,” thus
Confucianism usually asks people to “deny self and return
to propriety” in behaviors. Interestingly, as another important
cultural tradition to Chinese people, Buddhism also considers the
emotion of anger as one of the Three Poisons that would deeply
poison body and mind, so Buddhism asks people to abandon
“CHEN” (a religious word similar to anger) and “render good for
evil” in their behavior.
Based on these cultural considerations, one might assume
Americans would be affected by anger in risky choices, whereas
Chinese people might be shielded from the impact of anger
on behavior such as making choices under risk. As to the
effect of fear on behavior, given that Asians are likely to
suppress the expression of their negative emotions, and that
expressive suppression reduces risk-taking in Chinese people
(Li et al., 2015), the effects of fear on risk choice shown by
Lerner and Keltner (2001) might not show up in the present
research. However, the merge of Eastern and Western cultures
has increased in the last 30 years, and young people in China are
deeply influenced by Western culture. Hence, the effects of fear
and anger on risky choice preferences are difficult to determine
for the current Chinese youth. To our knowledge, the relationship
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between fear and anger and the risk preferences of Chinese people
has not been documented.
The analysis above based on the ATF leads us to hypothesize
that angry individuals prefer to make risk-seeking choices while
fearful individuals prefer to avoid risk. In the present study, we
aim to validate the ATF with Chinese samples by conducting
two studies to verify the same hypothesis. First, we examine
whether dispositional fear and anger would influence choices
under risk by the classic “Asian Disease Problem.” Second,
we address whether induced fear and anger would cause the
same effect on risk choices by a two-stage choice task with real
payoff.
STUDY 1: DISPOSITIONAL FEAR,
ANGER, AND FRAMING EFFECT
Behavioral economics suggests that the manner in which options
are framed alters a decision (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). In
general, individuals tend to be risk-averse in a gain frame –
i.e., one in which the task is described in such a way as to
emphasize the gains to be made – but tend to be risk-seeking
in a loss frame, in which the losses are emphasized. Further,
most of respondents become risk seeking when the choices are
framed as losses and become risk averse when identical choices
are framed as gains. The so-called risk preference reversal is a
robust empirical finding, which was explained according to the
psychological mechanism of loss aversion defined in the Prospect
Theory. However, recent evidence suggests individual differences
in emotion have an effect on risky choices and that effect will
hold across framing conditions (Lerner and Keltner, 2001). Based
on the ATF, the sense of uncertainty and the lack of control
associated with fear leads fearful individuals (or those with high
dispositional fear) to make risk-averse (certainty enhancing)
choices in both gain and loss frames. The sense of certainty and
control associated with anger would lead angry individuals (or
those with high dispositional anger) to make risk-seeking choices
in both gain and loss frames. It is important to note that a Valence
Theory would predict that fear and anger should be associated
with risk aversion across frames. The present study explored the
association between dispositional emotions (anger and fear) and
risk choices in order to assess the effect of dispositional anger and
fear on risk decision.
Methods
Design
This study used a within-subject design where participants were
assigned to both gain and loss frame scenarios in the “Asian
Disease Problem” task (as further explained in the Measures
and Procedure section). As there were no order effects found
in the framing manipulation presentation used by Lerner and
Keltner (2001), we did not counterbalance the order of scenarios
so that a single online questionnaire could be used in any
situation. Furthermore, participants’ dispositional anger and fear
(see Measures and Procedure section) were measured after they
completed the task.
Participants
A total of 372 college students (192 females) participated in this
survey. Their age ranged from 18 to 28 years (Mean = 22.45,
SD = 1.56). To avoid random answers due to incomprehension
of the questionnaire, we set up a screening question in the
questionnaire after they filled out all the scales: ‘Overall, you have
understood the above questions.’ As a result, we eliminated 26
participants who chose the answers ‘A little bit’ or ‘I am not sure’
to filter out rushed answers, resulting in 346 valid samples. This
study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of
behavioral experiment guidelines approved by the college Ethics
Committee of Guilin University of Technology with written
informed consent from all subjects. All subjects gave written
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
The protocol was approved by the college Ethics Committee of
Guilin University of Technology.
Measures and Procedure
In measuring dispositional fear and anger, the trait scales of
Spielberger (1983)’s State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) and
Spielberger (1996)’s State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory
(STAXI) are frequently adopted by researchers (e.g., Lerner and
Keltner, 2000, 2001). We measured participants’ dispositional
anger and fear with the Chinese version of the trait scale of
STAI as revised and validated by Tao (2009) and the trait scale
of STAXI revised by Li and Qian (1995). The emotion of fear
is closely related to anxiety. In psychology, fear is a feeling of
doom, unease, or apprehensiveness in response to imminent or
immediate danger, while anxiety is a feeling of doom, unease, or
apprehensiveness when no danger is present. Therefore, anxiety
is the same feeling as fear, but when there is no danger to react
to (Öhman, 2010). Anxiety differs from fear in having a fuzzy,
potential, or diffuse object which generally emerges from the
subject’s own fantasy and imagination. Given that, some studies
of fear are actually studies of anxiety, when the object of fear is
either fuzzy, potential, or diffuse. For this reason, the subjective
emotion ratings as assessed with the trait scale of the STAI and
STAXI on a four-point scale (from 1 “never” to 4 “always”)
included 20 items about dispositional fear and 10 items regarding
dispositional anger.
To measure the risk preference and the framing effect we
used the “Asian Disease Problem” task designed by Tversky
and Kahneman (1981). In this task, participants were asked to
imagine the occurrence of a disease outbreak in a city and to
choose between two alternative programs of how to combat
the disease. Under the gain frame, participants read the exact
scientific estimates of the program outcomes as follows: ‘If
Program A is adopted, then 200 people will be saved. If Program
B is adopted, then there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will
be saved and a 2/3 probability that no one will be saved.’ Under
the loss frame, participants read, ‘If Program A is adopted, then
400 people will die. If Program B is adopted, then there is a 1/3
probability that nobody will die and a 2/3 probability that 600
people will die.’ Choice A implies risk-aversion while choice B
implies risk-seeking. Participants had to make choices under both
frames. Questionnaires were designed and conducted via survey
website Sojump.
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Results
The “Asian Disease Problem”
More than half of the participants chose the riskless program A in
the gain frame, whereas most of the participants chose the risky
program B in the loss frame (Table 1). Wilcoxon Sign-rank test
suggested significant differences between the choices under the
gain and loss frames (z = 8.140, p ≤ 0.001), thereby confirming
the substantial impact of framing on risky choices. Specifically,
the difference between choice A and B was not significant within
the gain frame (χ2 = 3.746, p > 0.05), whereas the opposite is
the case within the loss frame (χ2 = 73.988, p < 0.001), thus
partly validating the typical risk preference change predicted by
prospect theory.
Dispositional Fear and Anger, and Their Framing
Effects
The trait scale of STAXI and the trait scale of STAI were reliable
(dispositional fear Cronbach’s α = 0.856, and dispositional
anger Cronbach’s α = 0.829). Following this, we produced the
dispositional fear (as fearD in Table 2) and anger (as angerD in
Table 2) indices by summing the total scores of all the items of
STAI and STAXI, respectively, for each participant as had been
done by Tao (2009). The resulting two indices had a significant
correlation (Pearson’s r = 0.429, p ≤ 0.001), which is in line with
the findings of Lerner and Keltner (2000).
Logistic regressions were performed to ascertain the effects
of dispositional fear and anger on the risky choices (risk-
seeking = 1, risk aversion = 0) under different frames (Table 2
for the results).
The significance of the logistic regression model is tested using
the Enter method that predicts choice as a function of fear,
anger, and their interaction. However, results showed that the
risky choices individuals made in either frame were not related
TABLE 1 | Choices under different frames.
Gain Loss
A 191 55% 93 27%
B 155 45% 253 73%
Total 346 100% 346 100%
A represents riskless option and B represents risk option.
TABLE 2 | Regression of choices on dispositional emotions.
R2 Factor B SE Wals Significance Exp(B)
Choice under gain frame
0.236 FearD 0.005 0.036 0.022 0.883 1.005
AngerD −0.058 0.102 0.322 0.570 0.944
FearD∗angerD 0.003 0.004 0.466 0.495 1.003
Choice under loss frame
0.274 FearD 0.047 0.039 1.452 0.228 1.048
AngerD 0.186 0.114 2.652 0.103 1.204
FearD∗angerD −0.005 0.004 1.493 0.222 0.995
FearD is the dispositional fear and angerD is the dispositional anger.
to dispositional fear or anger and no interactions were found
(p’s ≥ 0.103).
We found no evidence in support of our hypothesis in terms of
dispositional fear and anger influencing risk decisions. However,
we could not conclude that these two emotions have no effects
on risk preferences and the following study looking into the
relationship between induced anger, fear and risky choices was
conducted.
STUDY 2: INDUCED ANGER, FEAR AND
FRAMING EFFECT
People experience varying emotions in response to different
situations in life, and these emotional responses have ‘carryover’
effects on their attitudes and judgments on subsequent events or
problems for a while. Emotion induction is a common method
to experimentally explore the effects of emotion on various
processes. While some researchers have used imagination or
memory recall to induce emotions, film clips that contain sounds,
images, and texts are a more effective means of inducing affective
states in laboratory experiments (Gross and Levenson, 1995). The
present study induced emotions by asking participants to watch
emotionally charged film clips in order to assess the effect of
induced emotions on risk decision.
Methods
Design
A mixed design experiment was designed with the between-
subject measures of emotion inducing video watching, and the
within-subject measure of making decisions in the gain and loss
frame tasks. The success of emotion induction was measured by
either a fear (state scale of STAI-Form Y) or anger (state scale of
STAXI) questionnaire.
Participants
A total of 160 undergraduates (females = 97) who did not
take part in Study 1 participated in this experiment. Their age
ranged from 18 to 22 years (Mean = 20.38, SD = 1.06); 78
and 82 students were randomly assigned to the ‘fear’ group and
the ‘anger’ group, respectively. This study was carried out in
accordance with the recommendations of behavioral experiment
guidelines approved by the college Ethics Committee of Guilin
University of Technology with written informed consent from
all subjects. All subjects gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was
approved by the college Ethics Committee of Guilin University
of Technology.
Measures and Procedure
Emotion induction was performed by asking participants to view
4-min long emotion inducing video clips. The fear group watched
a trailer for the horror film named “Sadako reappearance.” This
clip had been validated in a pilot study, tested by a 19-item
emotional states scale, including fearful, sadness, disgust, happy,
anger, and neutrality (“indifferent,” “neutral,” and “unemotional”)
(She et al., 2016). Results showed that fear was the unique
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negative emotion induced by the clip [pre-test Mean = 7.02,
SD = 4.65, after-test Mean = 12.67, SD = 7.05, t(56) = 5.86,
p< 0.001, while all other p’s ≥ 0.597].
The anger group was asked to watch a 4-min film clip about
children being abused in a nursery. The anger-inducing video clip
was from an online news source from October 2012. We did a
pretest based on 30 students from the same University using the
same 19-item emotional states scale. Mean comparison results
showed that anger was changed significantly by the clip [pre-test
Mean = 8.92, SD = 4.77; after-test Mean = 12.07, SD = 7.05,
t(29) = 4.66, p ≤ 0.001], while all other negative emotions were
not affected by the clip (p’s ≥ 0.256).
It appeared that the experiences of fear or anger varied greatly
between participants as reflected in high standard deviations.
This is an expected result as individuals’ reactions to the stressors
are heterogeneous. Take, for example, horror films; some people
may enjoy watching them, while others refuse to watch because
they can easily make them feel uncomfortable.
The fear emotion of the participants was measured by 20 items
reported on a four-point scale according to the state scale of
STAI-Form Y revised by Li and Qian (1995). The anger of the
participants was measured by 15 items reported on a four-point
scale according to the state scale of STAXI revised by Tao (2009).
There are two ways of emotion measurement, one common way
is to measure a variety of emotions (such as the application of
19-item emotional states scale in the pre-test of videos) after
video watching, and then check whether the target emotions
(such as fear) generated in contrast with another baseline group
without emotion inducement. The method used in this study is
measuring the fear emotion of the fear group and measuring
the anger emotion of the anger group without a baseline group.
Considering the fact that different participants would experience
different levels of emotion, for example, someone has a strong
fear while someone has a weak fear, the variability of fear in this
group would serve as an independent variable to forecast risk
preference. We expected that participants with different levels
of emotional inducement would show different risk preferences
and therefore we could look into how variation of induced fear or
anger influences people’s risk choices.
Participants had to respond to the fear and anger measures,
which all used a four-point rating scale where 0 represented “not
at all” and 3 “very strongly.” The fear index was calculated as the
sum of 20 items of the state scale of STAI-Form Y while the anger
index was the sum of 15 items of STAXI. Table 3 provides the
descriptive information of the induced fear and anger indices.
Differently from the optimistic risk perception measure used
by Lerner and Keltner (2001), participants in our study had
to take part in a risky choice task that would determine their
remuneration. Many tasks (e.g., the “Asian Disease Problem”)
are hypothetical, in which participants are not held accountable
TABLE 3 | Description of induced emotions index.
N Min Max Mean SD
Induced anger 82 8.00 39.00 20.6 8.1
Induced fear 78 4.00 55.00 30.2 10.9
for their decisions; thus, their choices might not reflect their true
preferences. Considering this potential drawback, we designed a
choice task involving a risky decision with attainable monetary
outcomes. This part involved two tasks; a choice under gain
frame and a choice under loss frame. Before the experiment, the
experimenter told the participants that their choice related to
their true reward. However, we did not tell them there were two
tasks and only the second task determined their payoff until after
they had completed the first task. As a result, the participants were
led to believe that their choice in the first task would relate to the
actual reward, and the purpose of doing so was to ensure they
had an incentive for the first choice. In the first task, participants
were asked to “please choose between a guaranteed amount
of 10 RMB1 (about $1.60) (riskless program A) or drawing a
ping pong ball from a box (risky program B) with one red ball
that pays 30 RMB (about $4.80) and two white balls that pay
nothing.” After the first choice task was done, the participants
clicked a button to enter the loss frame choice task page that
they could not see previously. Before the second choice task, the
experimenter explained that the first task will produce no payoffs
and emphasized that the second task is independent of the first
task and will determine the actual reward. In the second task, all
participants were assigned an initial fund of 30 RMB, but were
told that they should make a choice to receive their real payoff.
They were asked to “please choose either losing 20 RMB (riskless
program A) or drawing a ball from the same box containing one
red ball and two white balls (risky program B), in which 30 RMB
would be deducted for a white ball and no deduction would be
applied for a red ball.”
All questionnaires were administered on computers using the
Sojump online platform. After the experiment, participants were
asked to claim their payments in the designated office the next
day. The risk aversion participants, that is, those who chose a
certain loss of 20 RMB, received 10 RMB immediately. The risk-
seeking ones had to draw a ball from a box containing one red ball
and two white balls and received their payoffs based on the draws.
The box with the balls was shown and the rules were explained to
the participants before the experiments.
Results
According to Table 4, in the fear groups, most of the participants
chose the riskless program A compared to the risky program B
in the gain frame (76% vs. 24%, χ2 = 20.513, p < 0.001) whereas
there was no significant difference between two programs in the
loss frame (49% vs. 51%, χ2 = 0.051, p > 0.05). On the other
hand, most of the participants in the anger groups chose the risky
program B compared to the riskless program A in the loss frame
(71% vs. 29%, χ2 = 14.098, p < 0.001) whereas there was no
significant difference between two programs in the gain frame
(54% vs. 46%, χ2 = 0.439, p > 0.05). These results suggested a
significant preference change as a function of framing. Wilcoxon
sign-rank tests suggested significant differences between the
choices under the gain and loss frames for fearful participants
(z= 3.572, p< 0.001) as well as for angry participants (z= 3.726,
p< 0.001).
1A regular breakfast costs 3.5 RMB in that university.
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Fear/Anger and Framing Effects
Logistic regressions were performed to ascertain the effects of
induced emotion strength on the risky choices (risk-seeking= 1,
risk averse = 0) under the gain and loss frames (Table 5 for the
results). The results imply significant associations between the
induced emotion strength and choices under both frames. That
is, induced fear strength significantly predicted subsequent the
riskless option in both gain (B = −0.062, p < 0.05) and loss
frame (B = −0.054, p < 0.05), whereas induced angry strength
significantly predicted subsequent the risky option in both gain
(B = 0.079, p < 0.01) and loss frame (B = 0.100, p < 0.01). Note
that the data in Table 4 showed the risky choice as a function
of framing in different emotion conditions (i.e., fear and angry),
whereas the data in Table 5 indicated that the induced emotion
strength significantly affected subsequent risky choices regardless
of frames.
The above analysis on the relationship between induced
emotions and risky choices are based on the overall data,
but given that we employed a within-subjects design; we have
the advantage to trace the choices of each participant under
different frames and detect within-subject preference reversals.
Accordingly, we analyzed four patterns of choices under the two
frames: ‘A–S: risk averse (gain) – risk seeking (loss),’ ‘S–S: risk
seeking (gain) – risk seeking (loss),’ ‘A–A: risk averse (gain) –
risk averse (loss),’ and ‘S–A: risk seeking (gain) – risk averse
(loss).’ The numbers of participants for the four-choice patterns
are shown in Table 6. Forty-six percent of the participants in
the fear groups exhibited risk-aversion patterns and 43% of the
participants in the anger groups exhibited risk-seeking patterns
across frames and accounted for the highest percentages in
each group. Only a small proportion (N = 23, 29%) of the
participants exhibited traditional risk preference reversals while
a large proportion (N = 53, 68% = 22% + 46%) exhibited
stable risk preferences across frames in the fear group. The same
phenomenon held true in the anger group. Only 23 (28%) of the
participants exhibited traditional risk preference reversals while
56 (69%) of the participants exhibited stable risk preferences
TABLE 4 | Number of A and B choices in different frames.
Fear group Anger group
Choice Gain Loss Gain Loss
A 76% 49% 54% 29%
B 24% 51% 46% 71%
Total N = 78 N = 82
A represents riskless option and B represents risk option.
TABLE 6 | Choice patterns across gain and loss frames.
Choice pattern Fear group Anger group
Number Proportion Number Proportion
A–S 23 29% 23 28%
S–S 17 22% 35 43%
A–A 36 46% 21 26%
S–A 2 3% 3 3%
Total 78 100% 82 100%
A–S – risk averse (gain) to risk seeking (loss); S–S – risk seeking (gain) to risk seeking
(loss); A–A – risk averse (gain) to risk averse (loss); S–A – risk seeking (gain) to risk
averse (loss).
across frames. The choice pattern between the fear group and the
anger group was significantly different (χ2 = 10.285, p < 0.05).
Specifically, the difference between the S–S and A–A pattern was
significant within the fear group (χ2 = 6.811, p ≤ 0.001) but not
significant within the anger group (χ2 = 3.500, p> 0.05).
DISCUSSION
This study explores whether and how fear and anger would
influence risk preference based on a sample of Chinese college
students. The “Asian Disease Problem” task was used in Study 1
to investigate the effects of dispositional fear and anger on risk
preference and a two-stage choice task with attainable monetary
outcomes was used in Study 2 to investigate the effects of induced
fear and anger. The hypothesis that angry individuals prefer
to make risk-seeking choices while fearful individuals prefer to
avoid risk was supported by the second study. However, we find
no associations between dispositional fear (or anger) and risk
decisions in Study 1.
We did not find a significant association between dispositional
emotions and risky choices as Lerner and Keltner (2001).
A possible explanation is that Chinese people differ from
Western people in dispositional fear and anger expression; they
are accustomed to separate their dispositional emotions from
behaviors. This means that the effects of dispositional emotions
on their behaviors are relatively weak compared to Western
people, especially when they make decisions in a virtual setting.
Thus dispositional emotions might not be a proper variable to
forecast behaviors for Chinese people.
The present data in Study 2 demonstrate that emotional state
affects risk choice; angry people tend to take risks while fearful
people tend to avoid risks. Logistic regression shows that induced
fear and anger have a significant negative or positive effect on risk
TABLE 5 | Logistic regression of choices on induced emotion strength.
Factor Risky choice B SE Wals Significance Exp(B) R2
Induced fear Gain frame −0.062 0.027 5.080 0.024 0.940 0.262
Loss frame −0.054 0.023 5.555 0.018 0.947 0.239
Induced anger Gain frame 0.079 0.030 6.899 0.009 1.082 0.254
Loss frame 0.100 0.036 7.626 0.006 1.105 0.226
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preferences, respectively, that is, fearful and angry individuals
tend to make risk aversion or seeking choices across frames.
A consistent measurement analysis that trace the choices of
each participant across gain and loss frames detecting within-
subject preference reversals further confirms the effect of induced
emotions on risky choices, i.e., the fearful participants avoid
risks whereas angry participants seek risks across frames. The
participants experiencing fear or anger were inclined to show
stable risk preferences across different frames.
The participants induced with high levels of fear or anger were
less influenced by the framing effect and exhibited consistent
risk preferences across gain and loss frames. The preference
reversals are presumably derived from the affective responses
evoked by the decision frames. Recent theoretical research
suggests that framing may be akin to an affective heuristic
(Slovic et al., 2002), and this argument is supported by evidence
from neuroimaging, which shows that decision frames evoke
neural activity in brain areas associated with affective processes
(De Martino et al., 2006). As a result, highly induced emotions
might suppress the affective responses evoked by decision
frames.
This main result in this paper supports our hypothesis and is
in line with those of Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) in terms
of induced emotions, which suggests the ATF can be applied
in explaining and guiding the decision making of people in
China. The second study revealed that fear and anger induced
by certain video clips have evident influence on risk choices.
The data from this study confirms the relationship between
induced emotions and risk preferences. According to the ATF
(Han et al., 2007), fear is related to the sense of uncertainty
and lack of control, and a fearful individual is inclined to
overestimate risk. For instance, fearful residents may boycott
an infrastructure project with long-term benefits sightlessly just
because of a small probability of a big disaster. Anger is related
to the sense of certainty and control. Therefore, an angry
individual might become overly optimistic and is more likely
to take risks. This person may tend to take excessive risks in
making important decisions and therefore suffer great loss. For
example, an angry husband makes a bad investment after an
intense argument with his wife or after a bitter argument with
his coworkers, or an executive officer impulsively chooses a
plan that has the potential to exceed the risk tolerance of the
organization.
This research has important implications for risk
communication for China, which is in a social transitional
period and sees increasingly complex social conflicts. The
conflicts – such as rich-poor conflicts, labor conflicts, city
demolition, medical disputes, moral anomie, and judicial
injustices – continue to emerge and impact social mentality
through social emotions. Anger and fear are easy to spread under
the present-day internet and social media environment, which
may evolve into emergencies or further expand the scope of
existing emergencies and intensify their negative consequences.
Under this context, our research provides an insight to explain
the mechanism of some mass incidents from the viewpoint of
how negative emotions affect risk judgment. For example, in
2014, the message of building a garbage incineration power
plant in the city of Hangzhou raised great concerns among the
residents. The situation resulted in protests and vandalism. In
this event, the negative emotions – mainly fear and anger –
played a key role throughout. First, people became jittery at the
mention of garbage incineration because they believe that it
potentially affects their health, the environmental quality, and
the value of the assets of the surrounding residents. The appraisal
of this uncertainty caused fear and further amplified the risk
perception. Whereas an investigation in 2012 showed 90.5%
of 123 garbage incineration plants have reached the emission
standard (Mass protests in response to Hangzhou plans to build
waste incineration power plant, n.d.), what the public sees,
however, is the 10% unqualified. Obviously, fearful residents are
inclined to overestimate the risk of garbage incineration plants,
which is confirmed in our experiment. Second, in this event
anger drove people to fabricate rumors and riot, which seriously
disrupted social order while it brought legal penalties for the
offenders. Based on this paper, we argue that angry people would
underestimate the possibility of punishment brought on them
by their aggressive behaviors, and also strengthen the optimistic
attitude of “no punishment if everybody does it.” It suggests that
emergency managers and the government should pay attention
to the negative emotions of relevant groups in public events.
It is important to understand people’s risk perception and take
targeted communication programs to further dispose of the
physical harm of risks.
A limitation of the current study design was not
counterbalancing the scenarios. In order to detect a significant
framing effect, researchers generally tend to use a between-
subject design rather that a within-subject design to test the
preference change, because participants in a within-subject
design could often note the connection between two questions
and thus make the consistent preference across framings,
which would make the observed framing effect insignificant.
Obviously, it is harder to capture a significant framing effect
with a within-subject design than with a between-subject design.
For our case, we found a significant framing effect even with
a within-subject design. That means participants still made
the different preference across framings even if they noted
our framing manipulation. Compared to previous findings, we
actually captured a stronger framing effect in the current study.
As for the scenario order, we admit that is a potential drawback.
Even if Lerner and Keltner (2001) did not find an order effect,
future studies should eliminate the limitation of the current
study by counterbalancing the study scenarios. In summary, our
experiment confirms the validation of the ATF through a sample
of college students in China. Our study enriches the literature
in emotional decision-making and provides a basis for future
explorations based on Chinese samples.
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